Senegal’s Political Turmoil Risks Furthering Jihadist Expansion

In early February, outgoing Senegalese President Macky Sall suddenly announced that presidential elections scheduled for February 25 were suspended. The decision sparked a constitutional crisis in the West African country. Opposition parties bitterly contested the decision and demonstrators flooded the streets in protest, to be met by deadly force. But parliament authorized the move, extending Sall’s term - due to end in April - by 10 months. Opposition representatives who denounced the president were removed from the National Assembly.

On February 22, Sall backtracked, saying he would step down in April as expected, and launch a political dialogue, but he didn’t give a new date for the presidential election, and it remains unclear when they will take place and whether a power vacuum will emerge.

The standoff threatens the “democratic stability” of Senegal, which has been the most consistently democratic country in Africa since its independence from France in 1960. It also increases the possibility of a military intervention in its political life, something unprecedented in Senegal. Moreover, the combination of political instability and economic collapse could open the way for jihadist groups in the Sahel to gain a foothold, particularly in the country’s east.

The Roots of the Crisis

The origins of Senegal’s current political crisis date back to constitutional amendments approved in 2016, under which presidents were limited to two terms. Sall’s first term began in 2012, but supporters hold that any term he served before the change did not count towards his permissible terms.

As opposition mounted, the Electoral Commission rejected the nomination of two prominent rivals to Sall: Karim Abdoulaye Wade, the son of former President Abdoulaye Wade, ruled out for accusing Supreme Court judges of corruption; and detained opposition figure Ousmane Sonko, who is backed by the youth and trade union movements.

Sall is suspected of seeking to groom another candidate close to Paris who could in theory win election in the first round. However, there are reports of deep differences between the president and his preferred candidate, Amadou Ba. It is also noteworthy that both former premier Mahammed Boun Abdallah Dionne and former Interior Minister Ali Ngoy Ndiaye have announced they will run; both are defected former allies of the Senegalese president.

Many observers suspect that the president fears the opposition could win, as Ba is lagging in opinion polls. Thus, he may believe that his best option is to coordinate with Karim Wade, who is both close to the Senegalese deep state and backed by France.

Political and Economic Challenges

Senegal’s political crisis comes amid a multipronged economic crunch of inflation, debt, and unemployment, exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing global price hikes on commodities caused food shortages across Senegal, bumping up electricity costs and fueling dissatisfaction with President Sall and his government. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate in Senegal has also grown since 2022, reaching 38%. Living expenses including the cost of healthcare and foodstuffs continue to be hit by runaway inflation that the government has so far been unable to control.

Thus, the Senegalese economy is facing severe challenges in parallel with political unrest since March 2021. Despite the development of the oil and gas sectors, which began production late last year, the country sorely needs to develop its industrial sector and create the necessary infrastructure to support it. This need is starkly demonstrated by the country’s high unemployment rates, which are 20% among the youth - the highest percentage since 2006. Climate change is also ravaging the country, causing more frequent and severe flooding near the coast and drought in the interior and thus threatening the backbone of an economy in which 75% of the population live on fishing and agriculture.

Senegal is a major partner of the United States in West Africa. The two nations have a defense treaty that allows a number of American soldiers to have a permanent presence in Senegal within the framework of the war on terror, since May 2016. Washington sees Senegal as one of the most stable democracies in Africa, and this is the first time that elections have been postponed since it gained independence in 1960. It also has one of the most professional and apolitical armies on the continent. These characteristics have pushed the United States to develop closer military and international relations with Dakar, including joint training exercises.

In June 2023, the judiciary convicted the main challenger to the Senegalese president, Ousmane Sonko, on charges of defamation and of “corrupting the youth”, which prevented him from running in the elections. The judiciary also dissolved Sonko’s opposition party in July 2023.

In this context, the postponement of elections and the decline of democratic norms in Senegal threatens to push it down the path of other countries in the region that has seen coups d’état, such as in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Although there had been few indications a coup was brewing in Burkina Faso in 2022, when it happened it received widespread popular support from a population fed up with insecurity and corruption. Pro-military sentiments also increased in Mali and Burkina Faso after the two countries established military councils to manage their transitional phases. The leaders of the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have exploited anti-French and anti-Western sentiments more generally to enhance their popular support, using a discourse of opposition to France and the West in favor of increased cooperation with Russia and Turkey, both of which have presented themselves as alternative security, military and economic partners.

Anti-French sentiment has been on the rise in Senegal since the beginning of 2021, when the head of the main opposition party, Ousmane Sonko, was arrested. Following his release, and before we was detained again along with the dissolution of his party in 2023, the anti-French youth and labor unions showed their clear support for him.

Al-Qaeda Sees Opportunities in Senegal

Since 2015, Al-Qaeda has repeatedly tried to expand its presence in Mali and Senegal via its affiliates. In January 2016, some 900 people were detained in Senegal on suspicion of collaborating with the group, suggesting that Al-Qaeda was already pushing to penetrate this strategically located West African country.

The Global Terrorism Index indicated that jihadist operations in the Sahel region accounted for 43% of the global total, which the highest share of any region in the world. Mali, which borders Senegal to the east, ranked fourth in the world on the list of countries most affected by “terrorism”. Burkina Faso was second (after Afghanistan).

Such organizations have no intention of remaining confined to the countries to the east of Senegal. They are ideologically committed to spreading their beliefs, and the situation in Senegal – instability and anti-government sentiment provides an ideal environment for them to find supporters there. Indeed, these organizations have proven adept, in other Sahel countries, at capitalizing on the same conditions: porous borders, widespread and growing corruption, weak rule of law, environmental degradation and economic crisis.

The Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM), based in western Mali, is likely to take advantage of the instability in Senegal to establish a foothold in the east of the country. The group has strengthened its presence in western Mali since 2020, and by last year it had quadrupled its attacks in the western province of Kayes compared to 2020. The city of Kayes lies just 80 kilometres from Senegalese border.

Indeed, in 2021 the Senegalese security services announced they had dismantled a JNIM sleeper cell close to the border with Mali, which indicates that the group is indeed hoping to gain a foothold in the country.

Another indicator that the group seeks to establish itself in eastern Senegal is that its members now control the smuggling route across the Malian border. They also sell livestock, which they collect through zakat taxes and royalties on the Senegalese side of the border. They also have Senegalese fighters among their ranks, which suggests that it is likely they have established local Senegalese cells.

JNIM’s expansion into Senegal could easily push Senegal to strengthen its security relations with Russia, as has happened with other countries in West Africa. This raises the very real possibility that Senegal becomes a new arena both for jihadist activity and for Russian involvement.