What Role for the Palestinian Authority in Post-War Gaza?

When the leadership of the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah refused to condemn the October 7 attacks, they faced an unprecedented political onslaught by religious right-wing politicians who dominate the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli political figures recited a mantra in the media, rejecting any political solution with the Palestinian people.

When Defense Minister Yoav Galant on March 15 laid out Israel’s “four bad alternatives” for dealing with the Gaza Strip after the war, he did not even mention the PA or the possibility of it returning to the Gaza Strip. This can be seen through the lens of Israeli efforts to prevent any geographical, administrative and political connection between Gaza and the West Bank. However, he said that having local PA-affiliated Palestinians administer the Strip would be the least bad post-war outcome for Israel.

The PA, for its part, kept its distance politically from the catastrophe afflicting Gaza at least for the first four months following the October 7 attacks. This led many observers to believe that it was seeking to avoid the repercussions of war and its political repercussions, which are far greater than the weakened PA can bear. Instead, it has opted to maintain its security role in the Israeli-occupied West Bank in order to prevent the violence in Gaza spilling over into the territory. It even refrained from clearly denouncing Israel’s confiscation of some 10,000 dunums (1,000 ha) of West Bank land in recent weeks.

The International Focus on PA Reform

Despite the Biden administration’s calls for a return to the “peace process” and its emphasis on the need to establish a Palestinian state – both bitterly opposed by the Netanyahu government – world powers have done nothing of substance to bolster Washington’s position. Nor have they put pressure on Israel, or given the Palestinians a single glimmer of hope that they might achieve their dream of statehood. Therefore, from a Palestinian perspective, this discourse from Washington is little more than media fodder aimed at justifying unlimited American support for the ongoing genocide in Gaza. Even in their communications with the leadership of the PA, U.S. officials make no mention of a Palestinian state.

Moreover, the Biden administration and governments in Europe, along with some in the region, have for months talked of the need to reform the PA, by forming a Palestinian government with broad powers, similar to the one created during the final years of the late President Yasser Arafat, in order to remove Mahmoud Abbas from the Palestinian decision-making process. The specter of such a scenario has presented Abbas with the threat of change.

Mahmoud Abbas Senses Danger

Abbas appears not to have grasped the gravity of the situation for months. Hamas does understand the level of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza as well as the territory’s urgent need for all forms of aid, regardless of domestic political differences.

Hussein Al-Sheikh, head of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, traveled to Riyadh on February 8 for a meeting aimed at strengthening the Arab position on the future of post-war Gaza. He faced a wave of regional criticism due to the position of the PA and Fatah on the situation in Gaza.

Then, Abu Dhabi-based Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan, who has powerful friends in the region, said that neither Abbas nor Hamas should remain in power. This, and attempts by the Emir of Qatar to convince Mahmoud Abbas of the need to revive Palestinian reconciliation, finally convinced Abbas of the seriousness of the situation. Reports soon appeared in the Palestinian media that prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh had resigned.

Abbas decided not wait for the outcome of reconciliation meetings between the Palestinian factions in Moscow. He opted instead to accept Shtayyeh’s resignation, and appointed economist Mohammad Mustafa, an independent, to form a technocratic government.

This did not live up to the demands of Hamas, according to the deputy head of the group’s “external” politburo Moussa Abu Marzouk, who said the movement would accept a government of technocrats with a “national reference”. Abbas has rejected such a solution, preferring to rearrange the chairs without making any substantial change to the government’s mandate or powers.

A Return to Gaza Without Reform?

Among the world and regional powers that have been pressing for reforms to the Palestinian Authority, there have been no negative responses to these moves by Abbas. Rather, many of them welcomed Mustafa’s appointment, underlining the fact that pressure for “reform” of the PA is merely aimed at pushing it to cooperate more closely with Israel on security in order to keeping the security situation in the West Bank under control and buffered from what is happening in Gaza, along with efforts behind the scenes to restore the PA to governing Gaza - once Hamas is eliminated.

In recent days, Israeli Channel 13 reported that a secret meeting took place on March 21 between Israeli army and Shin Bet officials and a senior figure from Fatah, during which they discussed the role of the PA following the Gaza War. This comes after a series of leaks about efforts by the head of the Palestinian intelligence service, Majed Faraj, to form the nucleus of a force that would eventually ensure security in the Gaza Strip.

These leaks align with reports that during the early weeks of the war on Gaza, European countries demanded that the PA prepare to assume security responsibilities in Gaza. These reports also suggested that a country in the region would help train PA security personnel, under international supervision, in an echo of a program set up by American Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, which “rebuilt” the Palestinian National Security Service, thousands of whose personnel trained in Jordan, after the second Palestinian Intifada in 2005.

Conclusion

Gallant’s comments in March, along with international and regional powers’ efforts to build a security framework for the PA to operate in Gaza, their welcome of the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa regardless of their previous demands for reform, and reports that ministers for the new technocratic government will be appointed in consultation with international parties, all indicate that there is international – maybe even Israeli – support for a PA return to governing the Gaza Strip.

This theory may also be supported by the fact that in mid-March, after Hamas had rejected its new government, Fatah - which had for months refused to condemn the October 7 attack on Israel - criticized Hamas for its “October 7th adventure”, saying it had led to “a worse and crueller nakba (catastrophe) than in 1948”.

That said, the PA’s return to administering Gaza would depend on the outcome of the current war, for which no timeline has been set, and Netanyahu is widely seen as having an interest in dragging out for as long as possible.

The PA may believe that aligning itself with international actors and cooperating with Israel on security in the West Bank, as well as shifting its position on the October 7 attack and accepting the formation of a new, internationally backed government, could help it return to the Gaza Strip. However, the challenge of gaining the acquiescence of Hamas and the rest of the Palestinian factions remains. This means that such a return remains far from being a foregone conclusion.