Why are the Houthis talking to Al-Shabaab?
2024-08-22207 view
Reports of a nascent relationship between Somali militant group Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthis seem contradictory at first. The former is a Salafi-jihadist organization, while the latter, aligned with Iran, belongs to the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam.
Yet a closer examination suggests that complementary interests could drive them into a marriage of convenience.
Both want to be able to apply military pressure in the Red Sea region, in order to paralyze international maritime traffic already disrupted by the Houthis, and to force ships to re-route.
Moreover, were Al-Shabaab to acquire advanced weapons from the Houthis, in exchange for much-needed cash, the Somali group could potentially become an offensive actor on a regional level—with ties to Iran.
A Marriage of Convenience?
To understand the paradoxical relationship between the two organizations, it is important to note that the Salafi-jihadist movement in Somalia has long used ideological propaganda against Sufis, accusing them of sorcery and of not being true Muslims.
Al-Shabaab, which announced its links with Al-Qaeda in 2012, has also accused Somali Sufis of being Shiites, a key tenet of Salafist-jihadist propaganda against its ideological rivals. By contrast, the Houthis built their identity on confronting extremist Sunni ideology.
Despite this, the groups have built a relationship of convenience, based on three main pillars.
Firstly, the Houthis—which are the de facto government in northern Yemen—are in desperate need of cash to resolve their domestic problems and pay their supporters and the salaries of state employees. They also want to recruit more fighters, while developing the structure, capabilities and effectiveness of their existing forces.
Al-Shabaab is in a position to provide these funds. The Somali group has proven adept at bypassing international sanctions against its senior leadership and funders. It does this thanks to a huge network of affiliated commercial entities, its ability to deal in cash or launder money through the purchase of gold, and limited government oversight of the Somali financial sector.
Secondly, Al-Shabaab needs to secure new supply lines of imported weapons. The group has not had access to the Indian Ocean since early 2023, when it lost control of coastal cities in the Galmudug region in the face of growing military pressure from the Somali government. The group also lost military clout in the Puntland region, specifically the Cal Miskaad Mountains, as the Islamic State group expanded there.
Thus the potential for a trade of Somali cash for Yemeni weapons. Were the Houthis to provide Al-Shabaab with drones and surface-to-air missiles, they could threaten targets across the Horn of Africa, particularly Western and American interests there.
Thirdly, both sides consider the United States as their number one enemy, further motivating each to deal with the other. This takes place in a context where U.S. influence in West Africa and the Horn of Africa is declining as a result of its interference in states’ domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Russia and China are on the rise, paying great attention to the region but limiting their involvement to economic and military cooperation.
Local reports suggest that a Houthi delegation met Al-Shabaab leaders in southern Somalia in the middle of the year, potentially preparing the way for a deal to smuggle advanced weapons such as drones and surface-to-air missiles to Somalia and take al-Shabaab fighters to Yemen to train them on how to use them.
There is no doubt that were Al-Shabaab to acquire such capacities, this would cause major headaches for Somalia and the region. For a start, it would put Somali government forces at risk and tilt the balance in the group’s favor on the battlefield, especially if it were able to field such advanced weaponry in the center and south of the country.
Regionally, Ethiopia would feel seriously threatened if its Islamist enemies acquired such capabilities. This could push Addis Ababa to launch a military operation to secure its territory and airspace. The same could apply to Kenya, whose borders remain insecure and whose troops often fall victim to Al-Shabaab bombs and land mines.
Al-Shabaab may also turn its sights on U.S. and British bases in the region, raising the sense of the entire Horn of Africa being on the alert.
However, within its own constituency, building a relationship with the Houthis could affect Al-Shabaab’s internal cohesion and undermine its ideological legitimacy, which leans heavily on refraining from cooperation with “foreigners”—that is, in the literature of jihadist movements, non-Muslims.
This discourse has been used to justify the fight against the Somali government for nearly two decades. Dealing with the Houthis could make the group’s narrative vulnerable to attacks by its traditional opponents in Somalia, including both its rivals: Salafists and Sufis.
Iran’s Hidden Hand
There is no direct indication as yet that Iran has played a role in forging ties between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. Some sources say Iran is aware of the relationship between the two parties, especially as it is unlikely that the Houthis would initiate such contacts without Iran’s knowledge.
Iran currently has no diplomatic relations with Somalia. Mogadishu expelled the Iranian diplomatic mission in late 2016, accusing the Islamic Republic of spreading Shiism. That decision coincided with Tehran’s severing of ties with Saudi Arabia after Iranian protestors attacked the Saudi embassy in Iran. Iran is still examining the possibility resolving its dispute with Mogadishu and returning to Somalia.
The relationship between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab is in its early phases. However, these meetings could lead to deeper ties in the future, unless the federal government and its international partners take urgent pre-emptive steps.
The prospect of Al-Shabaab using Iranian weapons to attack U.S. and Western targets in the region places Iran before a potential new breakthrough in the Horn of Africa—a region it sees as a priority for expansion.
