Lebanon's elections; done safely, and the country enters a critical juncture
2022-05-17299 view
After a long time of give and take, the Lebanese parliamentary elections eventually took place in the midst of unprecedented economic hardship. Sunday, May 15, 2022, Lebanese citizens headed to polls to cast ballots for representatives to fill 128 seats in a four-year term Parliament, according to a sectarian power-sharing system. The seats of the Parliament are distributed among religious groups and sects, in accordance with a complex and complicated electoral law based on the proportional system, with the so-called 'preferential voting'.
Two major issues dominated these elections: “Confronting Hezbollah” vs “Supporting the resistance,” and “Confronting the corrupt ruling elite” led by “change forces” vs « traditional forces » seeking to preserve their position in the Lebanese political establishment. The current voter turnout is (41.1%), which is lower than the 49.7% in 2018. Such a low turnout was expected, given the frustration the country is experiencing due to the difficult living conditions.
These elections were held despite local and international fears that they would not be held. Technical, logistical, political and security might have prevented it. Add to all that the announcement the Head of the so-called « Future Current, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, to boycott the elections either as candidates or voters. Such a boycott led to a shock and confusion among Lebanese Sunnis; especially when the Hariri family- since the days of the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri- represents the majority of the Lebanese Sunnis.
These elections are of great importance; especially, when Lebanon is going through unprecedented economic conditions. In the past couple of years, the country has witnessed a major collapse in various economic sectors, on top the collapse of the Lebanese Lira that lost more than 90% of its value against the US-dollar.
There are major indications in these elections that are sure to affect the scene over the coming era in the country. The most prominent of which are:
First, the "change forces" standing against the ruling class. Some of them had a key role in the "October 17" movement, or the so-called "October 17 Revolution", who succeeded in winning nearly ten seats in the parliament, according to the latest results. It is not clear, however, to what extent they will succeed in forming a single and unified bloc.
Second, Hezbollah and its ally in the so-called "Shiite duo", the "Amal Movement", won all the seats allocated to the Shiites in Lebanon (27 seats). Their alliance; however, lost at two levels. The opponents of this alliance focused on those two areas:
1-The loss of seats to Civil Society; one for the Druze and another previously for the Orthodox. This was expected, especially the two Hezbollah-Amal alliance-backed candidates for these two seats were the focus of much controversy. Also, the list of this alliance experienced a breakthrough made by the "Lebanese Forces" party over the Maronite seat in Baalbek-Hermel (this seat was also for the "Lebanese Forces" in the outgoing parliament).
2- A number of Hezbollah allies lost in these elections, including Druze leaders Talal Arslan and Wiam Wahhab.
Third, although it was said that the Hariri boycott did not fully succeed, areas with a large number of Sunni voters recorded the largest decline in voter turnout rates compared to 2018, specifically in Sidon (-16%), Minieh (-15%), Tripoli (-10%) and Dinnieh ( -15%). These elections; however, led to a fragmentation of the Sunni forces.
Fourth, after polling closed, some talked to media outlets that the “Lebanese Forces” party won more seats than its historic rival in the Christian regions and Hezbollah’s ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, that had the largest bloc in the 2018 parliament. The latter, however, denies this matter, saying that only the final official results decide this matter.
It is likely that Lebanon will be, after these elections, at a critical turning point, witnessing important and perhaps pivotal entitlements, which are summarized as follows:
First, the most prominent post-election event is the election of Lebanon's parliament speaker, i.e. the second position in the state, which is reserved for a Shi’ite Muslim under an unwritten sectarian power-sharing pact. While a number of blocs announced that they would not elect the leader of the "Amal Movement" Nabih Berri, who has held the position since 1992, it is expected that there will be political rivalries, and perhaps a charter crisis, with the absence of any Shiite MP outside the alliance consisting of "Hezbollah" and Amal Movement, and consequently, the absence of any competing candidate for Berri.
Second, to appoint a new prime minister, then to form the government. These two events may plunge the country into a new crisis for months. This has been the norm, when governments are formed in the past years.
Third, the rescue and reform path, that the new government must lead, in cooperation with the Parliament, is fraught with many obstacles.
Fourth, electing a new president of the republic (conventionally a Maronite Christian), which comes with the end of current President Michel Aoun's term in October, is expected to witness a lot of political bickering, even inside each political team. So far, only two main names have emerged, namely the two allies of Hezbollah: The Head of the Free Patriotic Movement, who is President Aoun's son-in-law, Gibran Bassil, and the Head of the Marada Movement, Suleiman Franjieh.
