ISIS Puzzling Media Tactic on Many Military Operations!

Observers of jihadist group affairs note that the Islamic State (ISIS) organization is considered one of the most active groups on the ground across various locations where its branches are spread. Despite this however, the organization barely claims about 20% of its branches' operations on the ground, which calls for an investigation into the reality of this phenomenon, its history, and the underlying reasons behind it.

Many statistics, especially those been released by Dimensions for Strategic Studies (DSS), confirm that the activity of the organization in Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Sahel countries in 2023 is at least double that of 2022.

However, ISIS media policy has not intensified its usual reporting on its operations through its official channels. Instead, it has opted to reduce claiming responsibilities for operations compared to previous years.

For instance, the organization has publicized just about 150 of its operations in Syria through its official platforms and weekly publication, Al-Naba, since the dawn of 2023. In contrast, the actual number of its operations proven on the ground exceeds 600 for this year, predominantly located in its strongholds, specifically Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and the region of Babdiat Homs, stretching toward Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, as well as Daraa.

In a similar vein, the number of operations in Mali that the organization has acknowledged in 2023 doesn’t exceed fifty, yet in actuality, the figure has crossed 100, as largely affirmed by local reports, with the majority occurring following the Niger coup on July 26, 2023.

The organization’s media secrecy policy can be seen with crucial details about its workings. For example, media outlets reported that a Turkish security operation resulted in the death of Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, the fourth leader of the Islamic State, towards the end of April 2023. However, it wasn't until early August 2023 that ISIS officially acknowledged his death and the allegiance to a new leader. It confirmed that the previous caliph was killed during clashes with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and announced the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as his successor.

These incidents, among many others, affirm that the organization focuses on not publicizing its operations and maintaining secrecy regarding its on-the-ground realities. This necessitates an examination of the dimensions and reasons behind this policy.

It's likely that this policy is in response to security considerations and media strategies aimed at preventing adversaries from forming a comprehensive understanding of the organization, its security, military, organizational, and propaganda statuses in the areas it operates in. Achieving this objective involves maintaining security secrecy and only disclosing operations under specific circumstances.

Among the most prominent cases are those that ensure the organization achieves propaganda gains. It's worth noting that the balance between these security considerations on one hand, and assessing the potential propaganda benefit on the other, varies between one branch of the organization and another. For instance, ISIS claimed responsibility for two bombings targeting civilians: one in a political gathering in Pakistan at the end of July 2023 that resulted in the death of 55 people and injured 200; and another against a high school in western Uganda in June 2023 that killed 40 students and teachers and injured 20 others. However, the organization did not claim responsibility for the bombing of a religious celebration in September 2023 in Mastung, in the Balochistan province of Pakistan.

Claiming responsibility for the first two operations confirms the organization's propaganda objectives aimed at attracting more individuals who are dissatisfied with the local authorities in both countries to its ranks. Additionally, these operations were characterized by their occurrence in non-traditional areas of operation for the organization, which lends it an image of being capable of penetrating enemy lines and executing complex, large-scale operations within their rear ranks.

However, the second operation mentioned as an example - after both Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani Jihadist Movement denied carrying it out - indicates that the organization deliberately did not claim responsibility for this operation to sow confusion in the region. By not clearly identifying the perpetrator, it forces security agencies to consider multiple possibilities regarding the planning and execution, between it and other organizations such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or Ansar al-Sharia, a new and rising group in the area. Consequently, this strategy complicates the security agencies' task, making it more difficult to track down and study the operation and to connect the threads of evidence to identify the correct organization behind it.This scenario is further reinforced by the organization's media behavior, which deliberately delayed the announcement of the death of its fourth leader, "Abu Husain al-Qurashi". The organization saw in media silence a particular interest for itself, leaving its adversaries in a prolonged period of questioning and speculation, especially with the escalation of operations against it in Syria and Iraq. However, the reality ultimately resulted in the appointment of another successor to Abu Husain al-Qurashi, where the process of his selection and the pledging of allegiance by the other branches took many months.

In summary, ISIS, for over a year now, has entered a phase that's more akin to media silence. This is apparent both towards regional issues and operations conducted against it, as well as the operations of its branches, despite the latter's escalation compared to previous years. This is due to various reasons, the most prominent being the enforcement of a security blackout on the organization's movements and preventing others from gaining a complete understanding of its developments and operational changes. The organization also tends to adopt a strategy of only announcing operations that ensure propaganda gains.