Al-Shabaab Shows its Strength With Deadly Bombings
2024-07-22285 view
On the evening of July 14, the Somali capital Mogadishu was rocked by a car bombing in front of a popular café, which killed nine civilians and wounded at least nine others. The bomb detonated as the venue, Top Coffee, was full of customers there to watch the final of the Euro 2024 football tournament.
Jihadist movement Al-Shabaab was quick to claim responsibility for the explosion. The government said the group had targeted an official building in the presidential complex area of the capital, killing or wounding at least 35 people.
The attack underlines several key points. Firstly, it shows that the movement is very much active, despite repeated announcements by the Somali government that it is close to destroying it and dismantling its capabilities. Secondly, it suggests that Al-Shabaab may resort to further car bombings against military and civilian sites. Finally, it demonstrates the group’s ability to penetrate the capital’s fortifications to carry out attacks, something it has successfully done dozens of times over the course of 2024.
Since the beginning of the year, Al-Shabaab has carried out 15 car bombings against either civilians or government and foreign forces, including two in July. Early in the month, the movement had targeted Djiboutian and Somali forces with a car bombing at a military base in the central state of Hiiraan, belonging to the African Union Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and which was in the process of being handed over to the Somali government.
Both attacks are clear indications of the strength that Al-Shabaab still maintains despite the ongoing military campaigns against it since August 2022. This lays out a grim picture of the future of Somalia following the African Union force’s withdrawal from the country, set to take place by the end of 2024.
Many observers believe this planned departure explains the movement’s stubbornness over any negotiations with the government: it realizes that it can win over many tribes in central and southern Somalia, as well as continuing to wage battle against the Somali government over the long term. This could mean the African Union will seek to create a new mission to replace the African peacekeeping mission to support the federal government.
There are also reports that a network involving the Yemeni Houthi movement and Somali officials is smuggling arms from Yemen to Somalia, some of which reach the Al-Shabaab movement. However, while the two sides might have concluded indirect deals, the sectarian and ideological differences between them—as well as their lack of shared goals—are likely to prevent them from reaching any more comprehensive agreements.
Therefore, Shabaab weapons purchase from networks close to the Houthis are less a form of normalization or partnership and more a strategy to take advantage of whatever resources the group has at hand to enhance its military capabilities. This theory chimes with the group’s growing attacks and efforts to seize control if villages and towns in central Somalia, which are likely an attempt to prepare for more attacks on security, political and civilian targets in the region, from which the Shabaab were expelled in 2011-2012.
