Multiple outside actors are exerting pressure on Iraq’s ruling political forces, namely the Iranian-allied Coordination Framework, to reformulate Baghdad’s relationship with Tehran. This comes amid rapid developments in the region since the outbreak of the war between Israel and Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Iran’s most important ally in the region, which has been significantly weakened by the assassination of its top commanders and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

The United States and the United Nations’ envoy to Iraq, Omani diplomat Mohamed al Hassan, recently handed the Iraqi government a list of international demands, including the restructuring of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and their integration into the state, the formulation of a foreign policy based on Iraqi rather than Iranian interests, and an end to damaging regional interventions for the benefit of Iran, especially in Lebanon and Syria—as well as political reforms at the domestic level.

This new wave of pressure began just days after longtime Syrian president Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow. For decades, the Assad regime had constituted a central pillar of Iranian influence in the region. With Hezbollah weakened by the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, who had been as important an asset to Iran as its own general, Qasem Soleimani, Iran is on the back foot in Lebanon and Syria. International actors are now turning their attention to Iraq and attempting to rearrange the political scene there.

This drive is led by Washington, which is likely to seek to perpetuate divisions that have emerged between Coordination Framework factions as the Israeli war on southern Lebanon has unfolded. Some factions have preferred to distance Iraq from the war, while pro-Iranian factions (led by Iraqi Hezbollah and radical Shiite paramilitary group Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba) continued to push for a wider involvement in the confrontation.

It is clear that Iraqi political forces are keenly aware of the declining Iranian role in the region, and expect more U.S. pressure on Tehran after Donald Trump is inaugurated as president in early 2025. Trump, whose first term was marked by his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, has already vowed to tighten the screws on the Islamic Republic.

The ruling political forces in Iraq want to avoid the country becoming a collateral victim to these pressures, or seeing Iraq turned, once again, into an arena for settling scores among outside powers. However, they also face domestic pressure from the Iranian-backed armed factions, preventing any major shift in foreign and domestic policies.

In all likelihood, these pressures will push Iraq’s ruling political forces—and Iran—to make concessions to regional players, based on the principle of shared interests in Iraq, in an attempt to avoid real political reforms or a complete Iranian defeat in the Iraqi space. This helps explain Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s frequent visits to Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in recent months.