Political Steps as the Sudanese Army Advances in Khartoum
2025-02-2455 view
On February 9, conflict-torn Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a post-war roadmap for the country, after extensive consultations with political and social forces that back the Transitional Sovereignty Council based in Port Sudan.
The roadmap comprises five main stages: A national dialogue, the formation of a government, amending the constitution, disarmament, and lifting the siege against the army in the western city of El Fasher.
Simultaneously, political forces backing the army’s adversary, the Rapid Support Forces, are seeking to form a parallel government in RSF-controlled areas. On February 18, they announced they are working on a political declaration and an interim constitution.
These moves, and their opposing outcomes, are the political extension of the military conflict between the RSF and the Transitional Sovereignty Council, which oversees the Sudanese army. Both sides are seeking to arm themselves with tools to exert political and societal pressure within their respective bases, leading a map of public legitimacy based on the map of military control.
The roadmap announced by the Transitional Sovereignty Council came after the Sudanese army made significant advances in Khartoum, where the RSF has faced a string of major losses. The paramilitary force is seeking to minimize its setbacks by bolstering its position in areas it does control, especially in the vast western region of Darfur, through political recognition from the population on the ground.
The head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has so far rejected the idea of partitioning Sudan into areas of influence, or based on the military realities on the ground. He is seeking to expand his own political base, reaching out to forces that had been sympathetic towards the RSF or had remained neutral throughout the conflict, such as part of the Progress Movement, and the Forces of Freedom and Change—Central Council (FFC-CC). That effort seeks to undermine RSF efforts to create a political base and gain legitimacy.
Yet the formation of another parallel government on Sudanese soil is unlikely, given the army’s advances in Khartoum. Nor is there any serious movement among international or regional players to grant political legitimacy or recognition to the RSF’s political rule over the areas it controls.
Nor, however, do the Transitional Sovereignty Council’s latest moves imply that the conflict is close to being resolved in its favor. Its current efforts face several obstacles, related to the interests of influential domestic players that still support the RSF, including defectors from the Progress Movement, and figures affiliated with the Islamist movement. Therefore, both the army and the RSF are likely to continue their fight as they each seek to shift the balance of power.
